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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network
industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form
demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously
decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions
under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated
monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very
low access charges may yield welfare losses, as infrastructure investment is undermined. We
provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly accepted among economists and regulators alike that deregulating
network industries—i.e. introducing competition into previously monopolized indus-
tries such as electric power, water, gas, or railroad transportation—can bring about
considerable welfare gains.1 Yet, recent experience with various forms of deregu-
lation is mixed: On the one hand, there are a number of success stories, typically
associated with the restructuring of telecommunications. On the other hand, there
are disturbing reports on ill-fated attempts to deregulate utilities such as the Cal-
ifornian electric power industry or the British railroad industry.2 Not surprisingly,
these restructuring disasters have triggered a public debate on the pros and cons of
deregulating network industries.
In this paper, we focus on one particular aspect of this debate, namely the notion
that deregulating an integrated monopoly is likely to bring about a degradation of
infrastructure quality. Abstracting from vertical relations, Spence (1975; 1977) has
established that the quality level provided by a profit maximizing monopolist will
generally deviate from the socially optimal level. When we consider a network mo-
nopolist’s provision of quality in a vertically-related industry subject to regulation,
however, the picture is less clear, as institutional and regulatory details have subtle
effects on investment incentives. In a recent paper, Buehler et al. (2004) demonstrate
that, for the case of a bilateral monopoly, the network monopolist’s incentive to in-
vest into infrastructure quality is typically smaller under vertical separation than
under vertical integration, although it is possible to construct counter-examples.
1For instance, in his presidential address to the European Economic Association, Newbery
(1997, 358) put forward the following thesis: “[...] introducing competition into previously monop-
olised and regulated network utilities is the key to achieving the full benefits of privatisation.”
2See, e.g., Joskow (2000), Borenstein (2002) and the special issue of the Journal of Industry,
Competition and Trade (2002) for the restructuring of the Californian electric power industry. The
Economist has documented the crisis in the British railroad industry in numerous articles, some
with telling titles such as “How not to run a railway” (November 25, 2000) and “Britain off the
rails” (March 17, 2001).
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In the present paper, we go beyond the case of bilateral monopoly and extend
previous research along two dimensions: First, in addition to vertical integration
and separation, we consider the case of liberalization, where the network monopolist
also operates in the downstream market. Both under separation and liberalization,
we allow for varying degrees of (imperfect) downstream competition. Second, we
provide a welfare analysis allowing us to discuss how to deal with the price-quality
tradeoffs encountered when deregulating network industries.
We model an industry where an essential input—the network infrastructure—
can be provided at various levels of quality. Network quality is costly to provide but
increases the value of the final product to customers. Under vertical integration, a
single firm chooses both the level of infrastructure quality and the retail price. In
the other market configurations, the upstream monopolist determines infrastructure
quality. Depending on the market configuration, the upstream monopolist’s profits
stem from access revenues (under vertical separation with various degrees of down-
stream competition) or both access and retail revenues (under liberalization with
various degrees of downstream competition). Downstream firms, in turn, pay an
access charge which is exogenously set by a regulator and independent of network
quality. The latter assumption may be justified by noting that quality is usually
difficult and costly to specify and therefore cannot be described ex ante in a contract
and ascertained ex post by a court. That is, quality is observable but non-verifiable
(see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1993).
Using a simple model with demand depending on price and quality, we derive
the following main results. First, regulatory authorities do indeed face a price-
quality tradeoff when deregulating network industries, as deregulating an integrated
monopoly cannot yield both a lower retail price and higher infrastructure quality.
This follows from the fact that in order to generate the same investment incentive
as under integration, the access charge under separation or liberalization must be
at least as large as the retail price under integration. Second, we identify necessary
and sufficient conditions under which restructuring and setting the access charge
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such that both retail price and infrastructure quality decrease relative to the in-
tegrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, deregulation may generate
welfare losses even if retail prices decrease. This may come about when the level
of the access charge is low enough to severely undermine the network monopolist’s
incentive to invest into infrastructure quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce
the analytical framework. In section 3, we discuss the equilibrium outcomes under
the various regimes. In section 4, we derive our main results based on an analysis
of the feasible price-quality bundles under each of these regimes. In section 5, we
provide an in-depth analysis of the linear demand model. In section 6, we discuss
limitations and extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
2.1 Assumptions
Consider a public utility which provides its final product using a network infrastruc-
ture, and suppose that a provider of the final product (e.g. electricity or transporta-
tion services) must have access to the network (e.g. the transmission grid or railroad
tracks). For simplicity, suppose that one unit of network access is required to pro-
duce one unit of the final product. Let D(p, θ) denote the demand for the final
product, where p ≥ 0 is the retail price and θ ≥ 0 reflects network quality.3 In line
with the literature (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1993), we assume that quality θ is
observable but non-verifiable, and hence non-contractible. This implies, in particu-
lar, that access charges cannot be made contractually dependent on θ. We think it is
natural to assume that quality is non-contractible in the present context, as explic-
itly specifying quality standards is extremely difficult and costly. Network quality θ
can thus hardly be described ex ante in a regulatory contract, let alone ascertained
3If quality encompasses multiple dimensions, θ should be interpreted as a real-valued index
summarizing the various aspects of quality.
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ex post by a court. This is consistent with the observation that, in practice, ac-
cess charges typically reflect network quality highly imperfectly. We therefore view
quality-independent access charges as a useful approximation to the real world that
allows us to expose the basic tradeoffs emanating from the deregulation of network
industries.
In the various market configurations considered below, we let n ≥ 1 denote the
number of firms operating in the downstream market. We assume that the regulator
prescribes a linear access charge a ≥ 0, whereas retail prices remain unregulated.4
We think this is a natural setting, as the deregulation of network industries typically
aims at introducing (imperfect) downstream competition, while using regulation to
contain the network monopolist’s remaining (upstream) market power. Finally, we
let the marginal cost of output be constant and normalized to zero and abstract
from fixed costs of operating the network.5
Throughout the paper, we require that the following basic assumptions are sat-
isfied, where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
[A1] The demand for the final product, D(p, θ), is twice continuously differentiable
and satisfies Dp(p, θ) < 0 and Dθ(p, θ) > 0. We let P (Q, θ) denote inverse
demand, with PQ(Q, θ) < 0 and Pθ(Q, θ) > 0.
[A2] The revenue function R(p, θ) ≡ pD(p, θ) satisfies
Rpθ(p, θ) = Dθ(p, θ) + pDpθ(p, θ) ≥ 0 for all (p, θ).
[A3] Producing quality level θ costs K(θ), with K ′(θ) > 0, K ′′(θ) > 0, and K(0) =
0.
Assumption [A1] makes demand depend positively on quality and negatively
on the price. That is, network quality has a demand-enhancing effect, creating
4As noted by Mandy and Sappington (forthcoming), it is common practice to use uniform and
non-discriminatory access charges. It will become clear, though, that for reasonable values, a fixed
component in access charges does not change the predictions of our analysis.
5The introduction of fixed costs does not affect the results (provided they are not too large).
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an incentive for the network provider to provide quality. [A2] imposes that the
marginal revenue of a quality increase is non-decreasing in the retail price. This
assumption allows for both parallel shifts (Dpθ = 0) and rotations of the demand
schedule (Dpθ 6= 0). All we require is that Dpθ is not too strongly negative (i.e., the
demand schedule must not rotate too much counter-clockwise).6 [A3] requires that
the cost function is increasing and convex in quality.7
We now describe the instruments available to regulatory authorities.
2.2 The Regulator’s Instruments
We consider the following policy instruments available to regulatory authorities:
(i) Market structure regulation. When deregulating public utilities, regula-
tory authorities may determine the preferred market configuration. In partic-
ular, when restructuring an integrated monopoly, regulatory authorities may
decide whether (and to what extent) to introduce downstream competition
and whether to break up the integrated network monopoly. That is, they
may decide about the industry’s future horizontal and vertical structure. We
will demonstrate below that by selecting a particular market configuration—
such as vertical separation or liberalization with a downstream oligopoly—
regulators select a particular set or “menu” of feasible price-quality bundles.
(ii) Access charge regulation. Once regulatory authorities have opted for a
particular market configuration (e.g. vertical separation with n downstream
6Many standard demand functions satisfy this assumption. For instance, for linear demand
D(p, θ) = α − βp + θ, with α, β > 0, an increase in θ gives rise to a parallel shift of the demand
schedule as Dpθ(p, θ) = 0, whereas for D(p, θ) = α − βp/θ, with α, β > 0 we have a clock-wise
rotation due to Dpθ(p, θ) = β/θ2 > 0. We consider the linear demand example in more detail in
section 5.
7More generally, the network provider’s cost function may depend on the level of output Q,
i.e., K˜(Q, θ). We restrict attention to the case where costs are additively separable in Q and θ and
marginal costs of output are constant and normalized to zero.
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firms) and thus implemented a menu of feasible price-quality bundles, a par-
ticular price-quality bundle is selected by determining the level of the access
charge. In an ideal world, the latter would be chosen so as to maximize social
welfare contingent on the market configuration. In doing so, regulatory policy
has to deal with the following tradeoff: Increasing the access charge enhances
the incentive to invest into infrastructure quality, but also increases the retail
price. Conversely, decreasing the access charge undermines the incentive to
invest into infrastructure quality, while reducing the retail price.
Below, we examine how regulatory authorities can use these instruments to deal
with price-quality tradeoffs when deregulating network industries.
3 Alternative Market Configurations
We consider market configurations (or regimes) that differ in the number of down-
stream firms n ≥ 1, and in whether the network monopolist is permitted to operate
in the downstream market. We call a regime “liberalization” if the vertically inte-
grated network monopolist operates in a downstream market composed of n firms
and denote it by L(n).8 If the network monopolist is banned from the downstream
market, we speak of “separation” and denote it by S(n). Finally, we denote the
benchmark of vertically integrated monopoly by I. For notational convenience, we
let ρ ∈ {I, S(n), L(n)} represent the relevant regime under consideration.
We now proceed to characterizing the price-quality bundles in the welfare opti-
mum and the various regimes ρ ∈ {I, S(n), L(n)}.
3.1 Welfare Optimum
Let
W (p, θ) =
∫ ∞
p
D(p˜, θ)dp˜+ pD(p, θ)−K(θ) (1)
8That is, the integrated network monopolist faces n− 1 downstream competitors.
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denote the social welfare function, where the first two terms represent gross consumer
surplus (i.e., net consumer surplus plus consumer expenditure), and the third term
refers to the cost of providing infrastructure quality θ. The welfare-maximizing
bundle (p∗, θ∗) solves
Wp = pDp ≤ 0 (2)
Wθ =
∫ ∞
p
Dθdp˜+ pDθ −K ′ ≤ 0. (3)
As the marginal cost of output is zero, the welfare maximizing price p∗ must be
equal to zero. The socially optimal level of quality θ∗ is strictly larger than zero,
implying that the social cost of a marginal increase of quality, given by K ′(θ), is
just equal to the marginal increase of gross consumer surplus (i.e., (3) holds with
equality).9
Since the vertical structure’s profit is negative in the welfare optimum, we also
consider the constrained welfare optimum assuring the vertical structure a non-
negative profit. We provide this optimization problem and its solution in the Ap-
pendix. Below, we shall use the outcome under integrated monopoly as the relevant
benchmark, as it is often taken to approximate the price-quality bundle provided by
a monopolistic public utility prior to restructuring.
3.2 Vertical Integration
Under vertical integration, ρ = I, the monopolist solves the following profit maxi-
mization problem:
max
Q,θ
pi(Q, θ) = QP (Q, θ)−K(θ).
Assuming an interior solution, the integrated monopolist’s choices pI and θI solve
piQ = P +QPQ = 0 (4)
piθ = QPθ −K ′ = 0. (5)
9Given p∗ = 0, θ∗ = 0 cannot satisfy (3), as Wθ =
∫∞
0
Dθdp˜ > 0 by [A1] and [A3].
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For given θ, the equilibrium price pI is strictly larger than zero by (4), causing the
integrated monopolist’s output to fall short of the optimal output. (5) indicates that
the equilibrium quality θI is also strictly larger than zero. Whether the integrated
monopolist undersupplies quality is less clear: As is well known from the literature,
the monopolist’s provision of quality depends on the output gap and the effect of
quality on the marginal willingness to pay of the average and the marginal consumer
(see, e.g., Tirole 1988).
3.3 Vertical Separation
Under vertical separation with n downstream firms competing a` la Cournot, ρ =
S(n), the network monopolist and the n independent providers of the final product
play a sequential game, taking the regulated access charge a and the number of
competitors n as given. This is a simple two-stage game, which can be solved using
backward induction. At the second stage of the game, given θ, downstream firm i
chooses its output so as to
max
qi
piD(qi, Q−i; θ, a, n) = qi (P (Q, θ)− a) ,
where Q−i =
∑
j 6=i qj denotes the sum of the competitors’ outputs and Q = qi+Q−i
denotes aggregate output. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition
is given by
piDqi = (P − a) + qiPQ = 0. (6)
Applying symmetry and letting qD(θ; a, n) denote each downstream firm’s equilib-
rium output (given quality level θ), aggregate output is given by QD(θ; a, n) =
nqD(θ; a, n).
In the first stage, the upstream network monopolist chooses quality θ so as to
max
θ
piU(θ; a, n) = anqD(θ; a, n)−K(θ).
At an interior solution, the monopolist’s choice of quality as a function of a and n
solves
piUθ = anq
D
θ −K ′ = 0. (7)
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Let (pS(n), θS(n)) denote the equilibrium price-quality bundle attained under vertical
separation. Note that these equilibrium values are functions of both the access
charge a and the number of downstream competitors n; varying a thus produces the
menu of feasible price-quality bundles, given ρ = S(n). That is, the choice of a is
crucial for comparing (pI , θI) and (pS(n), θS(n)). We shall discuss this in more detail
below.
For future reference, let us briefly consider two polar cases. First, setting n = 1
corresponds to a vertically separated industry with a downstream monopoly. Sec-
ondly, vertical separation with perfect downstream competition emerges when a
large number of firms (n→∞) compete a` la Cournot. In this case, the retail price
will be driven down to marginal cost irrespective of quality θ, so that pS(∞) = a.
3.4 Liberalization
Under liberalization with n downstream firms, ρ = L(n), there is a vertically in-
tegrated network monopolist competing with n − 1 independent downstream firms
a` la Cournot. Without loss of generality, let downstream firm i = 1 be the ver-
tically integrated monopolist. In the second stage of the game, downstream firms
choose their outputs according to (6).10 In the first stage, the integrated upstream
monopolist selects θ so as to
max
θ
piU(θ; a, n) = P (Q, θ)qD1 + aQ
D
−1(θ; a, n)−K(θ),
where QD−1(θ; a, n) = (n − 1)qD−1(θ; a, n) denotes the output of the firms operating
at the downstream market only. At an interior solution, the integrated network
monopolist’s choices of output and quality solve
piUθ =
(
PQ
[
(n− 1) ∂q
D
−1
∂θ
]
+ Pθ
)
qD1 + a(n− 1)
∂qD−1
∂θ
−K ′ = 0. (8)
10Note that Cournot competition at the downstream level will now be asymmetric as the in-
tegrated firm’s marginal costs of zero will generally differ from competitors’ marginal costs of
a.
9
We let (pL(n), θL(n)) denote the resulting equilibrium price-quality bundle under lib-
eralization.
Again, perfect downstream competition will drive the retail price down to the ac-
cess charge, just as under separation with perfect competition, i.e., pL(∞) = a. As a
result, the network monopolist will have the same incentive to invest into infrastruc-
ture quality as under separation with perfect downstream competition. It follows
immediately that liberalization with perfect downstream competition produces the
same outcome as vertical separation with perfect downstream competition for valid
access charges.
4 Analyzing Price-Quality Tradeoffs
In this section, we focus on the question of how regulatory authorities might use
the available policy instruments—market structure regulation and access charge
regulation—when faced with price-quality tradeoffs. More specifically, we shall de-
termine the set of feasible price-quality bundles under each regime ρ and ask how
to best set the access charge once a particular regime is in place.
Our first result states that, in our setting, regulatory authorities do face a price-
quality tradeoff when deregulating a vertically integrated network monopoly provid-
ing the price-quality bundle (pI , θI).
Proposition 1 (tradeoffs) Suppose [A1]-[A3] hold. Further assume that dp/dn ≤
0 and dθ/dn ≥ 0 under ρ ∈ {S(n), L(n)}, n ≥ 1. Then a price-quality bundle (p′, θ′),
such that p′ ≤ pI and θ′ ≥ θI , with at least one inequality being strict, is not feasible
under ρ ∈ {S(n), L(n)} for n ≥ 1.
Proof. With perfect downstream competition, the network provider’s rev-
enues are given by R˜(θ; a) ≡ aD(θ; a). Hence, the marginal returns to quality are
R˜θ(θ; a) = aDθ(θ; a), and the effect of an increase in a on marginal returns to quality
is given by
R˜aθ = Dθ + aDaθ ≥ 0,
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which is nonnegative by [A2]. That is, perfect competition replicates the bundle
(pI , θI) for pI = a, but it cannot provide a bundle (p′, θ′) such that p′ ≤ pI and
θ′ ≥ θI , with at least one inequality being strict. The claim follows from dp/dn ≤ 0
and dθ/dn ≥ 0 under ρ ∈ {S(n), L(n)} for n ≥ 1.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that restructuring a vertically integrated monopoly
cannot simultaneously reduce the retail price and increase infrastructure quality.
More specifically, it shows that any price reductions must come at the cost of sacri-
ficing infrastructure quality (and vice versa).
To understand the intuition for this result, first consider S(n). We want to
argue that the network provider’s investment incentive, R˜θ, is smaller than under
integration for any access charge a ≤ pI due to lower returns to increasing θ. To see
this, fix the access charge at a = pI and consider the effect of a quality increase.
Holding retail prices constant, the direct effect of a quality increase is an increase in
demand and thereby access revenues. However, there will also be an indirect (price-
mediated) effect on demand, as retail prices will endogenously rise with increases in
θ by [A2]. Since the network owner controls the retail price under integration, the
returns to increasing network quality must be higher than if prices were unchanged
by a simple optimality argument.11 As a result, the investment incentive must be
higher under vertical integration for a = pI . It should be clear that the result
holds a fortiori for a < pI . For a > pI , the retail price must be higher than pI by
the profit maximization of downstream firms. Hence, higher network quality than
under vertical integration can be achieved only by means of higher retail prices.
Next, consider investment incentives under L(n). Any access charge a > 0 leads
to a cost asymmetry between downstream firms, as the integrated firm’s marginal
costs are zero, whereas all other firms’ marginal costs are strictly positive. As the
access charge rises, this asymmetry increases for any quality level θ. It follows that
there is some critical access charge at which the asymmetry is sufficiently large
to squeeze non-integrated downstream firms out of the market. More specifically,
11After all, the integrated network owner could simply keep prices unchanged.
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for any access charge a ≥ pI , profits of the non-integrated competitors will be
compressed to zero, which produces an outcome identical to integrated monopoly.
Hence, for a ≥ pI , both price and quality will be the same as under integration.
Having shown that neither S(n) nor L(n) dominate the benchmark of integrated
monopoly in terms of both price and quality, we proceed to a more detailed com-
parison of regimes. In particular, we compare the benchmark outcome (pI , θI) with
the feasible outcomes under S(n) and L(n) in terms of welfare. Since these compar-
isons critically rely on the regulator’s choice of the access charge, we first provide
a general result on the welfare effects of infinitesimally changing the access charge,
starting from any feasible price-quality bundle (p, θ) under regime ρ. Since dereg-
ulation typically aims at reducing retail prices, we formulate the result in terms
of infinitesimal reductions of the access charge. To avoid excessive notation, we
let dp/dθ|ρ(p,θ) denote the slope of the menu of feasible price-quality bundles under
regime ρ, evaluated at the price-quality bundle (p, θ). Similarly, dp/dθ|W(p,θ) denotes
the slope of the welfare function evaluated at (p, θ).
Proposition 2 (local welfare change) Suppose [A1]-[A3] hold. Consider regime
ρ ∈ {S(n), L(n)}, n ≥ 1, where the access charge a is such that the resulting price-
quality bundle is (p, θ). Then marginally decreasing the access charge increases
welfare if and only if
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣ρ
(p,θ)
>
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣W
(p,θ)
, (9)
where
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣W
(p,θ)
≡ −Wθ
Wp
= −
∫∞
p
Dθdp˜+ pDθ −K ′
pDp
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that—starting from an initial access charge a resulting in
(p, θ) under regime ρ—marginally reducing the access charge increases welfare if
and only if the slope of the menu of feasible price-quality bundles under regime ρ is
larger than the slope of the welfare function evaluated at (p, θ). Figure 1 provides an
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illustration of Proposition 2, where (pI , θI) is the benchmark bundle and condition
(9) is satisfied.
<Figure 1 around here>
This result is useful for answering the question of whether there is scope for
welfare-improving deregulation through liberalization. To see this, consider the
benchmark bundle (pI , θI), which is also feasible under L(n) for a ≥ pI . Proposi-
tion 2 shows that there is scope for welfare-improving deregulation from I to L(n),
provided that (9) holds for ρ = L(n).12
Note that Proposition 2 can be used to evaluate the welfare effects of deregulation
only for regimes capable of reproducing (pI , θI). For instance, Proposition 2 cannot
be applied to comparisons involving I and S(n), n <∞, as (pI , θI) is not a feasible
bundle under the latter regime. Nevertheless, the result is useful for evaluating access
charge regulation under any regime ρ ∈ {S(n), L(n)}, as it allows to determine how
changes in access charges will affect welfare.
Our next result considers the welfare effects of non-infinitesimal changes in the
access charge. We show that even if there is scope for welfare-increasing reductions
of the access charge, there is a risk of setting the access charge too low.
Proposition 3 (global welfare change) Consider regime ρ ∈ {S(n), L(n)}, n ≥
1, where the access charge a is such that the resulting price-quality bundle is (p, θ).
Suppose [A1]-[A3] and (9) hold, i.e., marginally decreasing the access charge in-
creases welfare. Then decreasing the access charge by a non-infinitesimal
amount may reduce welfare.
Proof. We establish the claim using a graphical argument. Suppose decreasing
the access charge by a non-infinitesimal amount does not reduce welfare. Consider
regime ρ in figure 1, where all reductions of the access charge resulting in price
12A similar result holds for S(∞). It seems unlikely, though, that restructuring will lead to
perfect downstream competition.
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quality bundles between (pI , θI) and (p′, θ′) increase welfare. Larger reductions,
such as the one giving rise to (p′′, θ′′), reduce welfare.
Proposition 3 points to the risk of setting the access charge too low: Even if
there is scope for improving welfare by reducing the access charge, reducing it by a
large amount may yield welfare losses. Intuitively, this result follows from the fact
that reducing the access charge not only reduces the retail price but also discour-
ages investment in network quality. The latter effect may well dominate for large
reductions in access charges, giving rise to a negative welfare effect.
5 The Linear Demand Model
In this section, we provide an analysis of the linear demand model, where we can
derive closed-form solutions for prices and qualities. Let us assume that demand is
given by
D(p, θ) = α− βp+ θ, α > 0, β > 1
2
, (10)
where α and β are exogenous parameters. Further suppose that K(θ) = θ2. Note
that the linear demand example satisfies [A1]-[A3].
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium prices and quantities as functions of the
model parameters, as well as the respective menu equations describing the feasible
price-quality bundles in (p, θ)-space.
<Table 1 around here>
Figure 2 further provides an illustration of the linear demand model for para-
meter values α = 4 and β = 0.9.13 Note that price-quality bundles in the southeast
corner are preferred to bundles in the northwest corner. The welfare optimum (WO)
is in the lower-right corner at (p∗, θ∗) = (0, 5), whereas the constrained welfare opti-
mum (CWO) is at (p∗c , θ
∗
c ) ≈ (1.7, 3.1). The price-quality bundle (pI , θI) ≈ (3.1, 1.5)
under vertical integration—where we both have a higher price and lower quality than
13Qualitatively, the choice of specific parameter values does not affect figure 2.
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in the (constrained) welfare optimum—will be our main point of reference below.
All other regimes are represented by straight lines. Any point on any of these lines
can be obtained by fixing the access charge at a specific level, i.e., changes in access
charges reflect movements on the lines, whereas changes in regimes are reflected in
jumps from one line to another.14
<Figure 2 around here>
Using table 1 and figure 2, we now derive a number of results that highlight the
relevance of Propositions 1-3 above. First, inspection of figure 2 confirms for the
linear model that there is a tradeoff when deregulating an integrated monopoly (see
Proposition 1):
Result 1 A bundle (p′, θ′) such that p′ ≥ pI and θ′ ≥ θI , with at least one inequality
being strict, is not feasible. For improvements in one dimension only, the following
results hold:
(i) Increasing quality to any θ′ > θI is feasible under ρ = S(n), n ≥ 2 only, and
it comes at the cost of increasing the retail price to some p′ > pI .
(ii) Reducing the retail price to p′ < pI is feasible for S(n), n ≥ 1 and L(n), n ≥ 2,
but it comes at the cost of reducing quality to θ′ < θI .
Figure 2 further indicates that liberalization will perform better than separation
when restructuring aims at reducing retail prices. Comparison of the menus S(1)
and S(2) shows that any quality level θ attainable under S(1) may be attained
at a lower retail price under S(2). Thus, S(2) in a sense dominates S(1). Similar
arguments show that S(∞) dominates both S(1) and S(2). That is, the more intense
downstream competition, the lower the retail price at which a given quality level
may be attained. The problem with S(∞) is that, in practice, deregulation is
14For each line, the left boundary is given by the restriction θ ≥ 0, the right by the highest valid
access charge under the respective regime.
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unlikely to lead to perfect downstream competition. It is thus useful to compare the
various regimes to L(2), which represents the price-quality bundles feasible under
liberalization with two downstream firms.
Clearly, under L(2), quality levels above θI are not feasible for the reasons dis-
cussed above. However, for any quality level feasible under S(1), S(2) and L(2),
liberalization offers the lowest retail price and will thus be strictly preferred to S(1)
and S(2). More generally, for a given number of downstream firms, liberalization
is preferred to vertical separation if deregulation aims at reducing retail prices.15
The result still holds if the number of downstream firms approaches infinity. In this
case, liberalization becomes similar to vertical separation, which is reflected in a
counter-clockwise rotation of L(2) onto the lower part of S(∞) where p ≤ pI (see
figure 2).
Next, we examine whether there is scope for welfare-improving restructuring
in the linear demand model, starting from the benchmark of vertically integrated
monopoly. Substituting (10) into (1) and totally differentiating yields
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣W
(pI ,θI)
=
1
β
≈ 1.1,
whereas, from table 1, we have
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣L(2)
(pI ,θI)
=
1 + 6β
5β
≈ 1.4.
Since dp/dθ|L(2)
(pI ,θI)
> dp/dθ|W(pI ,θI) , it follows immediately that restructuring from
I to L(2) yields welfare gains for suitable access charges (see Proposition 2). A
similar result holds for restructuring from I to S(∞),16 with the qualification that,
in practice, restructuring is unlikely to lead to perfect downstream competition. The
next result summarizes these findings.
15In fact, the predictions of the linear demand model are even stronger than this: Any quality
level below θI can be achieved at a lower retail price using a liberalized market with n downstream
competitors than under separation with n+ 2 downstream competitors for any n ≥ 2.
16For S(∞), we have dp/dθ|S(∞)
(pI ,θI)
= 2 (see table 1).
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Result 2 In the linear demand model, there is scope for welfare-improving dereg-
ulation. In particular, for suitable access charges, restructuring from I to L(2) or
S(∞) improves welfare.
In figure 2, iso-welfare curves contain all price-quality bundles that yield some
constant level of social welfare. For instance, WL(2) gives all price-quality bundles
that yield the same welfare as L(2) provided the access charge is set optimally. At
this optimal access charge, the line of feasible price-quality bundles L(2) is tangent
to the iso-welfare curve WL(2). The notation is similar for all other market config-
urations. Observe that iso-welfare curves farther southeast denote higher levels of
welfare.
Finally, we consider non-infinitesimal reductions of the access charge, focusing
on the restructuring from I to L(2). Figure 2 indicates that, if the access charge is
set too low, welfare will actually be lower than under integration. More specifically,
if the regulator chooses a very low access charge—a point on L(2) to the left of
the intersection with W I—, the resulting welfare will be smaller than W I . This
implies that there is a risk of setting the access charge too low when restructuring
(see Proposition 3).17 In this setting, the critical reduction of the access charge,
∆a = pI − a′ > 0, can be calculated by equating the menu equation for L(2)
with the welfare function W (pI , θI) and then solving for the access charge a′ ≈ 1.1
associated with the intersection point. The next result summarizes these findings.
Result 3 In the linear demand model, setting the access charge too low may reduce
welfare relative toW (pI , θI). In particular, restructuring from I to L(2) and reducing
the access charge below a′ ≈ 1.1 reduces welfare.
Result 3 indicates that, starting from a = pI ≈ 3.1, the access charge may be
reduced by almost 65% before restructuring from I to L(2) yields welfare losses.18
17In contrast, if the access charge is set too high, the worst possible outcome is that L(2) is
equivalent to I, and welfare will thus be the same (this will happen for a ≥ pI).
18The retail price will then fall by about 29% to roughly 2.2.
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That is, at least in the linear model, regulatory authorities have a lot of leeway when
regulating the access charge.
6 Limitations and Extensions
We now discuss the plausibility of our results when (i) the network monopolist can
discriminate against downstream rivals, and (ii) downstream firms can contribute
to the provision of quality.
6.1 Discrimination of Downstream Rivals
It is well known that the integrated monopolist may have an incentive to engage in
non-price discrimination against its downstream rivals (see, e.g., Economides 1998,
Mandy 2000, Beard et al. 2001, Weisman and Kang 2001). In a recent paper, Mandy
and Sappington (forthcoming) show that both cost-increasing and demand-reducing
sabotage may be profitable from the integrated firm’s point of view under down-
stream Cournot competition.19 That is, non-price discrimination of downstream
rivals may occur under the regime ρ = L(n), n ≥ 2.
To see how non-price discrimination of downstream rivals may affect our re-
sults, we consider the case of cost-increasing sabotage.20 Following Mandy and
Sappington, let s ≥ 0 denote the units of cost-increasing sabotage undertaken by
the integrated monopolist, assuming that each unit of cost-increasing sabotage in-
creases rivals’ marginal costs by one unit. Further, let κ(s) denote the direct costs
incurred when undertaking s units of cost-increasing sabotage, where κ(s) is a non-
19However, these authors do not consider investment in infrastructure quality.
20The analysis of demand-reducing sabotage (e.g., quality discrimination against downstream
rivals) is beyond the scope of the paper. In addition, the upstream firm could conceivably lower
its own costs while raising the costs of downstream rivals by allowing the quality of the inputs
supplied to them to decline. At the same time, such quality degradation could be costly if: (a)
regulators penalize such behavior; or (b) the upstream monopolist cannot discriminate between
the quality of inputs supplied to rivals and itself.
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negative function increasing in s.21 At the second stage of the game, given θ and s,
downstream firm i now chooses its output so as to
max
qi
piD(qi, Q−i; θ, s, a, n) = qi (P (Q, θ)− a− s) , (11)
whereas the integrated upstream monopolist selects q1, θ and s so as to
max
q1,θ,s
piU(q1, θ, s; a, n) = P (Q, θ)q1 + aQ
D
−1(θ, s; a, n)−K(θ)− κ(s). (12)
Inspection of (11) indicates that, from the downstream competitors’ point of
view, cost-increasing sabotage is equivalent to an increase in the access charge. That
is, sabotage adds to the asymmetry between the integrated network monopolist and
its downstream competitors, making it more likely that the latter are squeezed out
of the market. In fact, if undertaking sabotage is costless, i.e., κ(s) = 0 for all s ≥ 0
(and the regulator does not prevent sabotage), the monopolist always chooses s so
that a+s = pI , forcing its competitors to exit from the market. The resulting price-
quality bundle will be (pI , θI). However, as sabotage is typically costly, downstream
competitors are unlikely to be fully forced out if the access charge is not very high.
In any case, the increase of the downstream competitors’ perceived marginal costs
reduces the efficiency at which the industry’s output is produced. As a result, the
retail price p at which a given quality level θ may be attained should be expected
to be higher than in the absence of sabotage.
We now want to argue that Propositions 1-3 are not affected by the introduction
of cost-increasing sabotage. To see this, first note that assumptions [A1]-[A3] still
hold under sabotage. Next, consider Proposition 1. Let us first focus on the case
where the downstream market is perfectly competitive and the access charge is
a ≥ pI . In this case, our above discussion suggests that downstream competitors
are squeezed out of the market. The integrated firm’s profit maximization then
yields (pI , θI). Now, for a < pI , s will be chosen such that the retail price is no
21We borrow this assumption from Mandy and Sappington (forthcoming). Note that with quality
discrimination, κ(s) might turn out to be negative (see Reiffen 1998).
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larger than pI , implying that the associated quality level is at best θI . That is, with
perfect competition, an outcome that dominates the price-quality bundle under I
in both dimensions is not feasible. Assuming that piUsθ (θ, s; a, n) < 0, implying that
the network monopolist’s incentive to invest is decreasing in the amount of sabotage
undertaken, leads to dθ/ds < 0, so that the quality level must be lower than θI . As
to Propositions 2 and 3, allowing for cost-increasing sabotage will affect the slope of
both the welfare function and the menu equation, but not the sufficient conditions
for welfare-improving changes in the access charge.
6.2 Downstream Quality
So far, we have limited ourselves to analyzing the network aspect of service quality.
Particularly, we have modeled quality as a demand enhancing service attribute, set
by a monopolistic network owner for the network as a whole, and thereby applying
uniformly to all downstream firms. Frequently however, the quality of network
services as perceived by the consumer depends not only on the quality of the network,
but also on quality attributes set individually by the downstream firms. Thus,
downstream firms can distinguish themselves from competitors through their choice
of service quality, and hence will compete for consumers not only in prices (or
quantities) but also in service quality.
Assuming that firms are competing in prices and quality amounts to assuming
differentiated Bertrand competition. More specifically, for given network quality
θ, let each downstream firm i = 1, ..., n, face a demand function Di(p, z, θ) where
p = (p1, ..., pn) and z = (z1, ..., zn) denote the vectors of retail prices and quality
levels, respectively. Without additional (non-trivial) assumptions on the interplay
of θ and z, the effects of deregulation on the sets of feasible price-quality bundles
under each regime remain ambiguous. However, we believe that studying a richer
framework along these lines will be useful for a better understanding of the price-
quality tradeoffs associated with deregulating network industries.
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7 Conclusions
Our analysis has produced a number of results that are of relevance for regulatory
policy. First, our model’s most striking message is that, starting from a situa-
tion where an integrated monopolist is in charge of network quality while operating
in the downstream market, any policy aimed at opening the downstream market
to competitors (and possibly banning the incumbent from that market) cannot si-
multaneously lead to both lower consumer prices and higher network quality. This
implies that any regulatory strategy of breaking up an integrated network monopoly
with the explicit goal of lowering consumer prices must be well aware that it can do
so only at the cost of sacrificing network quality.
Second, although no regime dominates the integrated monopoly in terms of both
price and quality, there is scope for welfare-improving deregulation. Both liberal-
izing and separating an integrated network monopoly are capable of generating
welfare improvements by trading off network quality against lower consumer prices
in a socially desirable way (although separation can do so only in conjunction with
sufficiently strong downstream competition).
Third, our analysis shows that the realization of welfare gains depends in a
delicate way on the level of access charges set by the regulatory authority. Here, the
advantage of liberalization over separation is that in the former market configuration,
the regulator only runs the risk of setting the access charge too low to generate
welfare gains, whereas high access charges will ‘at worst’ lead back to the integrated
monopoly by driving competitors out of the market.
Of course, one might argue that these policy implications are driven by the
assumption that regulatory authorities dispose of a rather limited set of instruments.
If, for instance, network quality was contractible, almost any level of quality could
be implemented. While we have argued that the assumption of non-contractible
network quality approximates regulatory practice fairly well, under a slightly wider
interpretation our model may also be used to make a different point: If network
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quality may be verified, contractually specified, and enforced, regulators should
consider this a real alternative to breaking up an integrated network monopoly,
regulating access charges, and letting the market do the rest—even if the regulation
of quality itself is costly.
Appendix
A.1 The Constrained Welfare Optimum
If the social planner aims at ensuring the firm a nonnegative profit, he chooses output and
quality so as to
max
p,θ
W (p, θ) s.t. pi(p, θ) = pD(p, θ)−K(θ) ≥ 0.
Assuming that the constraint holds with equality, the Lagrangian for this problem is given
by
L(p, θ, λ) =
∫ ∞
p
D(p˜, θ)dp˜+ pD(p, θ)−K(θ) + λ [pD(p, θ)−K(θ)] .
At an interior solution, the constrained optimum (p∗c , θ∗c ) solves
Lp = pDp + λ [D(p, θ) + pDp] = 0
Lθ =
∫ ∞
p
Dθdp˜+ pDθ −K ′ + λ
[
pDθ −K ′
]
= 0
Lλ = pD(p, θ)−K(θ) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Rewriting the slope of the line representing feasible price-quality bundles under regime ρ
yields
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣ρ
(p,θ)
=
dp/da
dθ/da
∣∣∣∣ρ
(p,θ)
,
i.e., the slope reflects the effects of a marginal change in a on both p and θ. By marginally
reducing the access charge (and thus network quality θ), welfare is increased if and only if
dW
dθ
∣∣∣∣
(p,θ)
=Wp
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣ρ
(p,θ)
+Wθ < 0.
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Partially differentiating the welfare function (1) with respect to p and θ yields Wp = pDp
(< 0, by [A1]) andWθ =
∫∞
p Dθ(p, θ)dp˜+pDθ(p, θ)−K ′(θ). Rewriting the above condition
yields
dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣ρ
(p,θ)
> −Wθ
Wp
≡ dp
dθ
∣∣∣∣W
(p,θ)
= −
∫∞
p Dθdp˜+ pDθ −K ′
pDp
.
This completes the proof.
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Table 1: Prices, Qualities, and Menu Equations.
Regime Retail price p Quality θ Menu Equation
WO 0 α2β−1 –
CWO α(4β−1)β
2α
4β−1 –
I 2α4β−1
α
4β−1 –
S(n) 2(n+1)α+an[1+2(n+1)β]
2(n+1)2β
a
2
n
(n+1) p =
α
(n+1)β +
1+2(n+1)β
(n+1)β θ
S(∞) a a/2 p = 2θ
L(n) 2(n+1)α+a(n−1)[1+2(n+1)β]
2(n+1)2β−2
2α+(n+3)(n−1)aβ
2(n+1)2β−2 p =
α
(n+3)β +
1+2(n+1)β
(n+3)β θ
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